Stationary or Moored Vessels and Floating Platforms

Under the “old law” and the traditional definition of a Jones Act vessel, floating but stationary production and work platforms were not considered vessels for the purpose of Jones Act coverage.  In 1990, a case in the fifth circuit outlined the analysis for determining whether floating platforms, floating work barges and quarterbarges are vessels under the Jones Act.[3]  The test was based on the premise that the more attributes a waterborne structure had that were similar in nature to that or a traditional vessel, the more likely that it would be deemed a Jones Act vessel.  Some attributes that the court recognized that were characteristic of traditional vessels include:

(1)    Navigational Aids

(2)    Lifeboats or other life-saving equipment

(3)    A raked bow

(4)    Bilge pumps

(5)    Crew quarters

(6)    Coast Guard registration as a vessel

Additionally, the court outlined a test for determining whether dry docks and floating work platforms were vessels or non-vessels.  The attributes of non-vessel platforms were noted as follows:

(1)    The structure is constructed to be used primarily as a work platform;

(2)    The structure is moored of otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and

(3)    Although the platform is capable of movement, and is sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of normal operations, any transportation function is merely incidental to the platforms primary purpose.

In that case, the court determined that a quarterbarge that lacked self-propulsion, provided messing, sleeping and recreational facilities, and was spudded down to the seafloor was not a vessel. 

In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the issue of vessel status in the case Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company.[4]  In that case, the Court realized that the definition of a vessel has necessarily broadened over time with the introduction of floating work platforms, barges used to carry tools and equipment and to house seamen, and various other waterborne structures.  The Court looked to the definition of a vessel that is provided in section 3 of Title 1 to the U.S. Code which states that “the word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance use, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”[5]  The Court decided that at the time the Longshore Act and the Jones Act were passed, the definition of a vessel was well settled and therefore we should look to that early definition for guidance in determining vessel status for Jones Act cases today.

Therefore, under the “new rule”, it is not necessary that a waterborne structure be capable of self-propulsion or that it actually be in navigation for it to qualify as a Jones Act vessel.  With the 2005 Supreme Court decision and subsequent interpretation by the appellate courts, the determination of vessel status under the Jones Act lies not only with the issue of whether a waterborne structure has enough vessel-like characteristics but whether it is “practically capable of being used for transportation on navigable waters”, as that is the determining factor.[6]

This new law has had a great effect on offshore employees.  Individuals working on production platforms may actually be seamen under the expanded definition of a vessel.  Tension leg platforms or Floating Offshore Installations are floating structures that are moored to the seafloor in a semi-permanent manner.  These floating platforms are intended to be kept at a specific location to produce oil and gas from wells in the ocean floor.  Such installations are used in regions where water depths make it economically unfeasible or impractical to install a fixed production platform on the ocean floor.  Although these floating structures are moored to the seafloor, and are not intended to be towed or moved from place to place, the mobility of the platform, the fact that it was towed to its current location and that when production at the current location ceases, it can and will be towed to a new location and reinstalled, provides the justification for classifying it as a vessel for the purposes of the LHWCA and the Jones Act.  This is important because the employees on these platforms can now pursue benefits under the Jones Act when they were previously limited to either longshore compensation or state compensation claims. 

The question has arisen whether boats that are taken out of commission and permanently moored to shore are now vessels for the purpose of the Jones Act.  They courts concluded that waterborne structures that are permanently moored to shore or the banks of a body of water, as in the case of drydocks, wharves, and certain boat structures are not vessels.  Boats that have been moored dockside and are connected to water, electricity and telephone systems of the city in which they are located are not vessels under the act.  But many structures that were previously excluded from Jones Act coverage are now included because of the broadened definition of the term vessel.